Introduction
We live in paradoxical times. Labour scholars have recently witnessed the rise of a 'polycentric' 1 universe of collective labour rights. Never before have there been so many transnational sources of collective labour rights (EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, European
Convention on Human Rights, European Social Charter, ILO Conventions). 2 This process is described as a form of constitutionalisation.
3 And yet, this 'rights inflation' did not arrest the ongoing neo-liberal assault against collective labour rights in Europe, mounted in the name of austerity, competitiveness and fiscal discipline. 4 Recent Greek developments throw this paradox into sharp relief. Greek collective labour law (CLL) may benefit from a constitutional scheme of express collective labour rights (collective autonomy, collective bargaining, trade union freedoms, right to strike), strengthened by the applicability of various transnational labour rights (vis-à-vis Greece's membership of the ILO, EU and Council of Europe). And yet, these rights did not prevent the multiple waves of EU/IMF-imposed domestic legislation from forcing an abrupt and deep transformation of the (pre-crisis) pro-worker identity of the Greek labour law into a new juridical nature of deregulation 5 and individualisation.
While the literature on the crisis is rich in accounts of Greek labour law reforms, 6 it has not devoted systematic attention to the constitutional dynamics behind the paradox. This article intends to address this deficit by adding two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it sets out a comprehensive analytical framework for mapping the process termed here as 'deconstitutionalisation' of collective labour rights. Secondly, it draws on the Greek experience as a case-study for generating reflections of relevance to the broader debate over the desirability of constitutionalising collective labour rights.
A preliminary issue concerns terminology. Unlike the much used term 'constitutionalisation', 'de-constitutionalisation' has not hitherto been used in labour law scholarship. This is unfortunate. We need a regressive term to describe the weakening or principles, and values of a ''constitution''', 7 de-constitutionalisation is the opposite process of releasing CLL from constitutional constraints. It is thus close to the type of constitutional response to the crisis identified by Contiades and Fontiadou as 'submission'. For them, submission refers to the situation when, 'exposed to informal change brought about by the crisis-induced rule production, some constitutions pathetically witness the erosion of their functions'. 8 As it is practically impossible to envisage any legislature formally amending the constitution so as to remove collective labour rights from the constitutional text, deconstitutionalisation is to almost invariably proceed via the dynamic mode of constitutional interpretation.
Following this clarification, let me now turn to the structure of the article. The analysis begins by introducing the constitutionalisation debate (section 2). Drawing on Eric Tucker's seminal work on multi-level capital and labour constitutions in the Canadian context, 9 it presents a triangular mapping of three normative spheres applying to the Greek case. The spheres are the (i) the transnational capital sphere, which relates to IMF-EU bailout conditionality; (ii) the transnational labour sphere; and (iii) the domestic labour sphere. After an overview of the Greek constitution and the austerity reforms (section 3), the analysis elucidates the interactions between the different spheres. More specifically, section 4 examines the normativity and content of conditionality. It then proceeds to identify the process of the 'aggressive internalisation' of conditionality at the domestic level as the result of two movements: (i) the 'capture' of domestic legislation by conditionality, and (ii) the 'incapacitation' of the labour constitution as a consequence of the thin and deferential construction of the concepts of proportionality and public interest arrived at by the Greek Courts. The next section (section 5) focuses on the interaction between the transnational and domestic levels of labour regulation. It examines ILO jurisprudence, which has provided a partial but 'soft' cover to domestic labour law by criticising some of the austerity reforms.
Then, it looks at case law of the Council of State (Simboulio tis Epikrateias), which has effectively blocked the application of ILO standards, and at pronouncements of ILO and other supervisory bodies on the state of the Greek legal order. The following section (section 6) takes notice of an absent interaction, namely between the transnational labour rights and conditionality within the EU sphere, which in effect immunises bailout conditionality from control by transnational labour rights. The final section (section 7) summarises the findings and contextualises Greek de-constitutionalisation in the broader constitutionalisation debate.
While submitting that the Greek developments support the sceptical side of this debate, especially by providing a continental European confirmation of Tucker's thesis, the article offers several new reflections of relevance to the constitutionalisation debate.
The 'De-Constitutionalisation Triangle': An Interactive Analytical Framework of Three Normative Spheres
For the purposes of establishing my analytical framework, it is necessary to introduce the labour constitutionalisation debate. Although the constitutionalisation of rights has been positively argued for in various national contexts, 10 it is Ruth Dukes who has, more generally, called for a labour constitution 11 at domestic, regional 12 and global levels. 13 For Dukes, though, constitutionalisation is 'synonymous with the legal recognition of worker rights'. 14 It may take the form of a constitutional entrenchment in a formal, written and normatively supreme constitution but does not need to. The constitutionalisation thesis, in so far as it is applied beyond the state to address 'race-to-the-bottom' pressures caused by globalisation, builds on the 'labour rights as human rights frame' 15 and the ambitious promise of a transnational integrated jurisprudence between the ILO, ECHR and EU.
16
The constitutionalisation project, mainly in its conception as a normatively supreme Taking its cue from Tucker, this article suggests a mapping of the Greek deconstitutionalisation process, one which is capable of registering the different levels of 'capital'
and 'labour' constitutionalisation in the Greek case. The principal thesis to be developed is that Greek de-constitutionalisation should be understood as the cumulative outcome of a specific configuration of interactions (and non-interactions), synergistic and conflicting, within a triangle consisting of the following normative spheres.
The first is the sphere of IMF-EU bailout conditionality ('conditionality'). 
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The second source of conditionality was 'hard law'. It followed from the inclusion of certain Memoranda conditions into EU Council Decisions on specific deficit-reduction actions 48 to be taken within a specific time-limit by a country that 'persists in failing to put into practice the Recommendation of the Council'. 49 These Decisions -and arguably the Memoranda with the European Union institutions having as a foundation these decisions-fall within the 'hard law' forms of the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) mechanism. They were issued by the Council acting upon recommendations made by the Commission. In effect, these decisions performed the task of the formalisation and legalisation of conditionality by embedding them in the 'hard law' fiscal part of the formal EU architecture. 46 From January 2015, the Troika became a quartet with the addition of a representative from the European Stability Mechanism. The article keeps the terminology Troika as almost all labour law legislation considered were enacted before this change. 47 To summarise, the normativity of conditionality can be illustrated with the metaphor of a prism: the same obligation, depending on the instrumental medium, comes out in dual 'hard' (Council Decisions) and 'soft' (Memoranda) law colours. The soft law aspect, though, was in reality more effective than the hard aspect. The reason for this was its attachment to dominium.
The latter was the critical gradient, giving conditionality its strength.
Conditionality as Transnational Capital Sphere
In this sub-section, the analysis moves on from the form and normativity of conditionality to its content. It argues that EU/IMF conditionality should be seen as a transnational capital
sphere. This sphere developed out of the synchronisation of the evolutionary paths of two processes of capital constitutionalisation, namely the IMF (international level) and the EU's (or Eurozone's) macro-economic constitutionalisation. The resultant synergy was responsible for the neo-liberal and de-regulatory substance of the transnational sphere of conditionality.
On the IMF, to say that it engages in neo-liberalisation promoting capital interests is hardly controversial. The institution, at least since the 1980s, promotes extreme de-regulatory labour law policies through its structural conditionality programmes under a technocratic, monetarised and neo-liberal paradigm. 50 Tucker is right to consider IMF as a 'neoliberal constitutional project' belonging to capital constitutions. Regarding the EU, the capital-orientated nature of conditionality can be understood only against the backdrop of the evolution of the so-called 'European economic constitution'.
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Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori have observed during the crisis a central mutation within the EU's economic constitution from the dominance of the micro-economic layer (fundamental freedoms, free competition) to that of the macro-economic layer, directed towards attaining fiscal targets and objectives. 53 Indeed, the 'macro-economic constitution' was subjected to an intense constitutionalisation during the crisis, 54 prioritizing fiscal discipline and fiscal consolidation as overriding constitutional objectives. For CLL, this shift precipitated major consequences. In the presence of the IMF which has consistently put CLL structural reforms in its conditionality, the European Economic Constitution extended its material scope (despite Article 153(5) TFEU) 55 to treat collective labour law de-construction as a requisite concretisation of its fiscal and economic aims. A clear imperialist dynamic of the economic constitution towards CLL and the social policy field in general could be detected.
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In this environment, conditionality emerged as the product of the normative constellation that sprang from the neo-liberal alignment of the process of European integration, Eurozone integration and IMF governance in the face of the crisis. The plurality of its institutional architecture should not detract our attention from its singularity, in terms of substance. All provisions could be easily summarised as imposing a single duty on the Greek state to de- freeing employers from restraints. However, the distinctive feature of conditionality is that its normative influence does not derive from its formal normative supremacy but from its ability to fully capitalize on the dominium of the state for imposing its rules.
At this point, let me consider two possible counter-arguments to my thesis. 59 The first would challenge the characterisation of the EU's macro-economic layer as 'capital' and not 'economic' constitutionalisation. This is because it is guided by macro-economic imperatives which are distinct, at least formally, from capital rights. While this may be formally true, it is essential that our understanding of the macro-economic constitution is not co-opted by accepting its claims for distinctiveness at face-value. The claim to neutral macro-economic goals may be nothing more than a mask, which has the effect, of promoting more effectively the rights of capital. Indeed, a qualitative assessment of its objectives and policies would suggest a one-sided orientation towards capital right. For instance, let us take the goal of 'competitiveness'. This aim is not as class-neutral as its proponents claim to be. This is because
the metric of what counts as 'success' in this competition, in its exclusive focus on business needs and profits, naturally favours and registers the interests of those who own the sources of profit and production, namely capital. The same applies to the related aim of 'labour unit cost Having engaged with these helpful counter-arguments, let me now move to consider how this 'dominium over imperium' entered the domestic labour sphere.
The 'Aggressive' Internalisation of Bailout Conditionality in the Domestic Labour Sphere
Conditionality, especially as expressed in the Memoranda, introduced a foreign and unconventional layer into the domestic legal order. Its declared purpose was to deconstruct the 60 For the primacy of the economic over the social constitution see the programme to which all the measures are contained is necessary, with such determination being only subject to 'marginal review'.
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The 2307/2014 Council of State's ruling essentially applied this 'thin' construction of proportionality to the issue of collective autonomy. Although the Court recognised that the reforms 'restrict the field of collective autonomy' and 'constitute a serious decline of workers' rights and a respective weakening of their position vis-à-vis employers', 79 it continued by observing that these measures were part of the broader set of Memoranda conditions.
Subsequently, it drew attention to four factors that rendered these conditions compliant with the marginal constitutional review. Firstly, it referred to the fiscal aims of the Memoranda, including those of reducing labour units and increasing competitiveness. 80 Secondly, the Court pointed out that these measures were undertaken under the exceptional circumstances of a threatening debt default and the collapse of the national Greek economy with unpredictable economic and social consequences. 81 Here we can see how 'dominium' (the use of resources to force legislation) 82 and the emergency rationale are constitutionally acknowledged. They shape the public interest element of the proportionality review, with the effect of releasing constitutional constraints on the reform legislation. Thirdly, the technical capacity of the Memoranda to achieve their stated aims was held to lie beyond the scope of judicial review. Evidently, the Council of State adopted a minimalist version of the minimum core. It is hardly an exaggeration to state that only a blanket prohibition of collective agreements can fall within the minimum core as determined by the Court. This approach is consistent with the pre-crisis jurisprudence of the Greek Courts, where it was held that the constitutional right of collective autonomy imposes on the legislator only a duty not to 'fully weaken the institution of collective autonomy', 85 but without explicitly mentioning the minimum core.
As an exception to its generally deferential attitude, the Council of State ruled that the arbitration reforms (the elimination of unilateral recourse to arbitration and the legislative restriction of its scope to basic wages and four types of occupational benefits) were unconstitutional. This conclusion was justified on two grounds. The concepts of 'public interest' and 'proportionality' functioned as transmission belts, by which bailout conditionality and dominium were injected into the domestic constitutional layer.
A deeper examination reveals that the domestic constitutional layer, although formally independent of the bailout-conditionality normative sphere, was colonised by the transnational sphere of conditionality. The following interactions could be located, evidencing the framing of proportionality under the transnational normative sphere of conditionality.
Firstly, the transnational dimension becomes clear, as long as one is attentive to the derivative dimension of the public interest invoked. Instead of assessing each measure's intrinsic ability to foster a particular economic aim, the determinative factor for the Court was their 'en bloc' attachment as conditionality to an external loan assistance program providing the requisite financial resources. In a sense, public interest equates with a blind general interest to preserve the dominium imposed by conditionality.
Secondly, repeated judicial references to the Eurozone and EU context of the obligation to undertake fiscal consolidation enabled the 'hard law' light of the EU macro-economic constitution to penetrate, through the public interest, the domestic constitutional order. between the legislator and the judge, between the political and judicial power'. 97 If one accepts this perspective, the entire discourse becomes one of comparative institutional analysis. When asking which institution is better equipped to deal with the complex economic and financial issues arising from the crisis, this approach replies that the executive branch of government is the best-placed institution. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the government has the technical administrative capacity to address these issues in a systematic and positive way, particularly in light of their predominantly fiscal nature. Secondly, the executive branch is vested with the constitutional responsibility to 'define and direct the general policy of the country'.
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Whilst these arguments are not wholly without merit, it is difficult to reconcile the thin approach of the Court with the spirit and purpose of constitutional rights. Its major weakness concerns the construction of the public interest. As the public interest is a concept which is internal to the constitution, it cannot be defined in purely fiscal terms. Instead, it should integrate social considerations and conform to the constitutionally-guaranteed sociallycommitted market economy. 99 Consequently, respect for collective labour rights should be part of the public interest, never antithetical to it. They are fundamental for the social orientation of the economic system and the socially-committed nature of the economy. In addition, since limitations on rights should be a matter of last resort and narrowly interpreted, there should be a 'thicker' proportionality review. This is the very essence of the necessity test within the concept of proportionality. To conclude, the discussion in this section has mapped the process of the incapacitation of the protective function of the labour constitution which arose from the Court adopting a 'thin' approach to proportionality review. This process enabled conditionality to maintain the capture and de-construction of CLL. 
Interactions Between the Transnational and Domestic Labour

The International Labour Layer: the ILO on the Greek CLL Crisis Reforms
The ILO jurisprudence on Greek reforms is found in the annual observations of the Committee concern' its 'deep regret' that 'such far-reaching changes were made without full and thorough discussions with all the social partners concerned'. 106 Similarly, the CFA urged that 'permanent and intensive social dialogue be held on all issues raised in the complaint'. 107 This dialogue did However, the ILO's criticism was only partial. Three crisis measures were deemed compliant with ILO standards. The first is the elimination of the erga omnes extension of sectoral agreements, in respect of which the CFA observed that 'there is no duty to extend agreements from the perspective of freedom of association principles'. 114 The second is the reduction of the after-effect period of collective agreements from six to three months. The CFA found no violation of the principles of free collective bargaining, but attempted to qualify this finding by observing 'that it comes within an overall context where imposed decentralization 108 For Memorandum I (n 38) there was no social dialogue. For Memorandum II (n 38) there was dialogue but the Memorandum stated that it 'fell short of expectations' and suggested unilateral imposition (75 120 For Greece, however, even this pressure is not available.
The legislature is captured by the dominium of IMF-EU conditionality and is thereby unresponsive to domestic social pressures. In addition, unlike the soft-law Memoranda, ILO norms lack any institutional mechanism akin to dominium for their effectiveness. They are not part of conditionality. Consequently, the enforcement of ILO norms and their penetration into the domestic normative sphere is fully dependent on the Member States' domestic legal system and their use by domestic judicial actors. 
The Lack of Internalisation of the Transnational Labour Sphere in the Domestic
Greek De-Constitutionalisation in Context: Concluding Reflections
Only when all 'triangular' interactions are pieced together, is it possible to grasp the deconstitutionalisation process in its entirety and complexity. This is the sum total of the set of interactions (and non-interactions): (1) the 'aggressive internalisation' of conditionality in the domestic labour sphere by legislative capture (through dominium), and the incapacitation of the containment function of the domestic labour constitution (by proportionality/public interest); (2) the weak interaction between the domestic and transnational labour spheres; (3) the absence of interaction between conditionality and the transnational labour sphere.
Transnational Capital Sphere (EU-IMF Conditionality)
'Strong' Interaction constitutionalisations. This clash tests the effectiveness of labour rights in the most paradigmatic manner. This is especially important at a time where hopes are increasingly pinned on labour rights, mostly transnational ones, for reorienting collective labour law in a more worker-protective direction. Secondly, unlike other instances where it has been necessary to derive, in a formal-nominalist way, a right of collective bargaining and right to strike from freedom of association, Greece is a country that has been already there. It has a socialdemocratic constitution and an express scheme of constitutionalised labour rights. Thirdly, the Greek case is notable because, notwithstanding the intensity of the deconstruction process, labour rights defences were not adequately triggered.
Let me now advance several broader concluding reflections from the Greek deconstitutionalisation in the context of the broader constitutionalisation debate. Moreover, the Greek story may be of relevance to the discourse on the possibility of transplantation of collective labour law rules. In his article 'On Uses and Misuses of
Comparative Law', Otto Kahn-Freund was highly sceptical of this possibility. For him, 140 To be sure, the Council of EU Decisions were hard but in reality the soft Memoranda were actually the effective instruments where conditionality was produced and negotiated. 141 Within the EU, labour rights have a primary status (pursuant to the Charter's treaty effect) whilst Memoranda are, at best, secondary law as Council Decisions.
specific, nation-bound socio-political structures and power relations render collective labour relations resistant to transplantation. 142 Coming from a different theoretical perspective (systems theory), Gunther Teubner has generally argued that transplants are 'irritants' for the domestic system, so that the (foreign rule) 'is an outside noise which creates wild perturbations in the interplay of discourses within these [domestic] arrangements and forces them not only to reconstruct internally their own rules but to reconstruct from scratch the alien element itself'. 143 Assuming that one understands conditionality as imposing the transplantation of a deregulated and de-centralised system of collective bargaining, 144 the Greek experience seems to negate rather than confirm these theses. This is because, to put it in terms of Kahn-Freund's metaphor, it was the 'organism' (Greek CLL and Constitution) that adapted to the transplant This judicial approach, however, suffers from a major defect. It is blind to the function of 'proportionality' and public interest as, effectively, instruments of the domestic capital constitution.
Finally, the Greek de-constitutionalisation serves a pointer to the perils of open-ended concepts, such as proportionality, for the constitutional operation of collective labour rights.
Davidov has recently advocated for the use of open-ended standards as adaptable and malleable. 148 The risk here is not intrinsic in the concepts themselves, but in the way they are used within a constitutional ordering: they give a broad normative flexibility to the state to bypass constitutional restraints whilst keeping up a pretence of adherence to the constitutional legality. This normative flexibility is problematic for labour law when the state is captured by capital interests (if we assume that it operates in a capitalist economy). And, if one agrees with any sort (Marxist or not) of thesis which sees the state a biased towards capital, this type of capture is not infrequent. 149 Hence Greek developments should caution against nominalist accounts focusing on the formal constitutionalisation of collective labour rights and ignoring
the risks of open-ended concepts. 150 The invocation of proportionality was sufficient to alter the social-democratic balance, built into the Greek constitutional scheme of socially-committed market economy, towards capital rights.
Put in the broader picture, the Greek constitutionalisation suggests that the added value of the 'social-democratic' over the 'liberal constitution' 151 In showing that a constitutional cover for labour rights does not per se render the protective labour edifice bullet-proof from the capital constitution, the account developed in this paper reveals the limits of the constitution and law. As we move forward in uncertain times, learning from the reality of constitutional labour rights rather than a romanticised or idealist version of them is essential. The Greek experience shows, to paraphrase Marx, that even the most solid constitutional norms can 'melt into thin air' when confronted with capital interests. And this is not an academic abstraction. The frustration of constitutional claims for workers and their families translates into wage reductions, decline of living standards, humiliation in the workplace by employers ready to wield the upper hand, and a generalised feeling of injustice.
The Greek de-constitutionalisation issues a powerful reminder that the effectiveness of a constitutional labour edifice is not, and can never be, solely a juridical affair of formulating the rights norms or granting them the 'right' normative quality, but ultimately rests upon extralegal social forces. If the Greek case, by exposing the limits of constitutionalisation, assists us in dispensing with the rights' illusions, it may be an unfortunate gift. A distraction to a true
